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We develop a model in which two ¯rms from di®erent countries compete on each
other domestic market. Each ¯rm is jointly owned by the residents and the govern-
ment of its country. The extent of the government's stake in the public enterprise is
endogenous and it determines the weight given to domestic consumers' surplus in the
¯rm's payo® function. We show that the choice of each government's stake depends
on a trade-o® between allocative e±ciency on the domestic market and pro¯tability of
foreign markets. Wealso highlight the fact that the government's stakein onecountry
has an impact on ¯rms' behavior in both countries.
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In recent years, several countries have implemented regulatory reforms in their public utility
sectors such as telecommunications, electricity and postal services. A common feature of
these reforms is the move away from franchised monopolies toward more open markets by
removing some or all existing barriers to entry.1
Inmany cases, most notably in countries oftheEuropean Union, the franchisedmonopoly
which was providing the service before the introduction of regulatory reforms was a state-
owned enterprise. Governments have often, but not always, combined their regulatory re-
forms with partial or total privatization of the incumbent public ¯rm. Since the most likely
entrants in one market are often incumbents operating in neighbouring markets, competition
in newly liberalized markets is likely to involve ¯rms which display di®erent ownership pat-
terns. For instance, state-owned ¶ Electricit¶ e de France competes with ¶ Electrabel, a Belgian
private ¯rm. In the same way, 55% of France Telecom shares are owned by the French
government; this ¯rm could eventually compete with Telecom Italia (3% of shares owned by
the Italian government).2 In North America, publicly-owned Hydro-Qu¶ ebec (HQ) competes
in the US wholesale electricity markets against producers that are mainly privately-owned.
Even though the Quebec provincial government has shown no intent to privatize HQ in the
aftermath of the opening of the US electricity market, the neighbouring province of Ontario
has taken a di®erent stand by adopting a plan to privatize parts of the generation assets of
its publicly-owned utility, Ontario Hydro.
The choices made by governments with respect to the ownership structure of their public
utilities and theresultingcompetitionamong ¯rms with mixed (private and state) ownership,
1In electricity, franchised monopoly is generally maintained for transmission and distribution, which are
still considered to be a natural monopoly. Franchising is also likely to be maintained for speci¯c postal
services, such as rural distribution, that are deemed to be essential and to be natural monopolies under
current technologies.
2Data on shareholding structure are for 2001.
2raise two questions. First, what are the relevant trade-o®s made by governments when they
choose their stake in a public utility which faces competition at home and abroad? Second,
what is the impact of state ownership on market operations?
The second question is puzzling since, in the face of the recognized ine±ciencies of the
former regulatory framework, we would expect that governments would aim at improving
market e±ciency. However, little is known on the e±ciency properties of an industry struc-
ture which involves competition between mixed enterprises. On the one hand, economic
models in industrial organization are generally based on the assumption that ¯rms maximize
pro¯t. Such an assumptionseems ill suitedto describe the behavior of ¯rms which are partly
or totally controlled by governments. On the other hand, models that focus explicitly on
state-owned enterprises generally assume that the market is monopolistic. At this stage,
the expected e±ciency improvement from the substitution of regulated monopolies by com-
petition as currently implemented rests more on hunches than on appropriate theoretical
results.
This paper analyzes the decisions with respect to output by two ¯rms that compete on
two markets under di®erent jurisdictions (country, state, etc.); for ease of presentation, the
latter are taken to be countries. Firms are partly or wholly owned by the governments of
their respective domestic markets. The government's stake in a ¯rm determines the weight
given to domestic consumer's surplus in the ¯rm's objective function. Each ¯rm maximizes
pro¯t °owing from foreign market operations. Allocation of output between the two ¯rms
is then the result of a two-stage game. In the ¯rst stage, each government chooses its stake
in the domestic ¯rm in order to maximize domestic welfare. In the second stage, each ¯rm
determines output on domestic and foreign markets in order to maximize the weighted sum
of domestic consumers' surplus and ¯rm's pro¯t, where the weights are determined by the
¯rst stage.
Because the occurence of multi-market competition among public enterprises is rather
new, to our knowledge, little attention has been paid to this topic thus far. We nevertheless
3draw on two strands of literature. The ¯rst is the literature on \mixed oligopolies", where
a public ¯rm competes with one or several private ¯rms on the same market. De Fraja and
Delbono [7] provides a survey of this literature. Our model is related to this literature in
the sense that, within a single market (domestic or foreign), a publicly-owned ¯rm competes
with a pro¯t-maximizing one. We add to this setting the interaction between domestic and
foreign markets. In this respect, our model extends the work of Matsumara's [12]. It is
also akin to the idea of White [15] that public ownership allows the government to assign
\an objective function to the public ¯rm administrator, strategically designed to maximize
the governing body's true objective function" (p. 488). Although White uses this fact
to let the government pursue a hidden agenda instead of welfare maximization, here the
discrepency between the ¯rm's objective function and both welfare or pro¯t maximization
will be strategically chosen by government in order to reduce market ine±ciencies of the
oligopoly structure.
A second strand of literature comes from the much larger ¯eld of international economics.
Brander and Spencer [4], [5], Dixit [9], Brander and Krugman [3], Krugman [11] and Eaton
and Grossman [10] have studied the impact of government policies, such as export subsidies
or import tari®s, onexchanges between countries in oligopoly structures. Inall those papers,
government policies are used to increase the domestic ¯rms pro¯t at equilibrium. In Eaton
and Grossman[10], they are also used to reduce the di®erence between price and marginal
cost at equilibrium. In our paper, public ownership will also be used strategically with the
aim of increasing domestic welfare, and this will involve a trade-o® between domestic ¯rms'
pro¯tability on foreign markets and the price-marginal cost discrepency. In a context where
subsidies and tari®s can be contestedas unfairpractices (e.g. at the WTO), public ownership
can then be seen as a substitute for subsidies and tari®s to increase domestic welfare.
In the next section, we develop the model. Sections 3 and 4 present the Nash equilibria
of the second and ¯rst stages, respectively. We conclude by discussing possible extensions.
42 Model
An homogeneous good is sold on two separate markets located in two countries, labelled 1
and 2. The good is not storable, and thus arbitrage opportunities from one market to the
other are precluded. Market i's inverse demand function for this good is pi(Xi), where Xi is
total consumption in country i and where pi(¢) is a strictly decreasingandtwice di®erentiable
function.
Each country i is served by the same two ¯rms, a domestic ¯rm, which is jointly owned
by the private sector and country i's government, and a foreign ¯rm, which is also jointly
owned by the private sector and the foreign government j 6= i. We denote by ®i 2 [0;1] the
portion of shares of ¯rm i (i 2 f1;2g) owned by government i.3
We assume that output delivered to the foreign market is a perfect substitute to output
delivered to the domestic market. For instance, this would be the case when ¯rms use the
same equipment to supply both markets. Then, letting xij be the output of ¯rm i sold on
market j and Ci be its (twice di®erentiable) cost function, we can write the ¯rm's pro¯t
function ¼i(¢) as follows:
¼i(xii;xij;xji;xjj) = pi(xii + xji)xii + pj (xij + xjj)xij ¡ Ci(xii +xij); j 6= i; i;j 2 f1;2g
(1)
Assuming that the private shareholders of ¯rm i are residents of country i, welfare of country
i is given by:
Wi(xii;xij;xji;xjj) = CSi(xii;xji) +¼i(xii;xij;xji;xjj) (2)
where CSi(xii;xji) ´
hR xii+xji
0 pi(x)dx ¡ pi(xii + xji)(xii + xji)
i
is country i consumers' sur-
plus.
Private shareholders seek to maximize pro¯t while government aims at aggregate con-
sumers' and producer's surplus maximization.
3We exclude the case where a government would also own part of the foreign ¯rm.
5The government can exercise control over its domestic ¯rm through its shareholding of
the ¯rm. The aim of this control is to make the domestic ¯rm's managers to take also into
account welfare in their objective function. Government thus chooses a share of ownership
®i that allows it to impose its preferred welfare weight °i in the ¯rm's objective function.
The latter is thus:
Ui(xii;xij;xji;xjj) = °iWi(xii;xij;xji;xjj)+ (1 ¡°i)¼i(xii;xij;xji;xjj)
= °iCSi(xii;xji)+ ¼i(xii;xij;xji;xjj) (3)
We do not explicitly model the relationship between ®i and °i as this can vary with the
institutional context of each country. As a result, we consider that government i chooses
directly °i and buys shares accordingly. We assume that °i(®i) is non-decreasing in ®i.4
This encompasses almost all situations. For instance, Matsumara [12] and BÄ os [1] use a
continuous, non-decreasing function with °i(0) = 0 and °i(1) = 1. However we can also
consider a case where the majority owner obtains total control over ¯rms' decisions. In
such a case, this means that the ¯rm's objective function is standard pro¯t maximization
as long as government remains a minority shareholder. On the other hand, government
could assign any weight to welfare whenever it is a majority holder, i.e. it can modulate its
e®ective control as it sees ¯t whenever it gets 50% of the shares. In such a case, we have
°i(®i) = 0;8°i = [0;0:5) and °i(®i) 2 [0;1];8®i = [0:5;1]: Hereafter, the decision variable
is taken to be °i in order to avoid this indeterminancy between shareholding and e®ective
control.5As °i represents the weight given by the domestic ¯rm's managers to government's
objective, we will call it the government's stake in the ¯rm (as opposed to its shareholding).
4Note that °i(®i) is not necessarily a function but can be a relation as the exemple on majority share-
holding will show below.
5We assume that there is no direct cost associated with public ownership, so a transfer of shares from
domestic private shareholders to the public sector is a transfer of money within the country and does not
a®ect welfare. Including a shadow cost of public funds would not a®ect results qualitatively.
6In a framework where governments and ¯rms have perfect knowledge of both demand
functions as well as both cost functions, we consider the following two-stage game. In
the ¯rst stage, governments determine independently their stakes in order to maximize (2).
Given these stakes, ¯rms determine their output for both markets in order to maximize (3).
We search for Nash equilibria at both stages. As usual, we begin the analysis with the
second stage.
3 Firms' Choices of Output
3.1 First Order Conditions
We search for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where ¯rm i maximizes its payo® Ui given output
(xji;xjj) of ¯rm j:
max
xii;xij
Ui(xii;xij;xji;xjj) i = 1;2 (4)




i(xii + xji) ¢ (xii + xji) +pi(xii +xji)+ p0
i(xii + xji)¢ xii ¡ C0
i(xii +xij) · 0
@Ui
@xii
xii = 0 xii ¸ 0 (5)
@Ui
@xij
= pj(xij +xjj) +p0
j(xij + xjj) ¢xij ¡ C0
i(xii + xij) · 0
@Ui
@xij
xij = 0 xij ¸ 0 (6)
The term ¡°ip0
i ¢ (xii +xji) +pi + p0
i ¢ xii in condition (5) represents the marginal bene¯t of
domestic production to ¯rm i. Since the government is a stakeholder, this bene¯t is not
restricted to the marginal revenue (pi+p0
i¢xii): it involves also the gain in consumer surplus
from increased production (¡p0
i ¢ (xii + xji)). This gain is weighted by the government's
7stake in the ¯rm. Condition (5) thus compares the ¯rm's marginal bene¯t of domestic sales
to their marginal cost. As the ¯rm maximizes pro¯t on the foreign market, condition (6)
compares marginal revenue of foreign sales to their marginal cost.
When solving (5) and (6), several cases arise as each of the four variables can take a
positive or zero value at equilibrium. However, as mentionned in the introduction, we are
particularly interested in multi-market competition of mixed enterprises. This allows us to
restrict the number of cases, as shown in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 If °i > 0 for i = 1 or i = 2, then at least one of the market is supplied by the
domestic ¯rm at equilibrium, i.e either x11 > 0 or x22 > 0 (or both).
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that 0 < °1 · 1 (while 0 · °2 · 1) and that
the equilibrium is such that x11 = x22 = 0: Then x21 = X1 and x12 = X2 and the ¯rst order
conditions become:
(1 ¡ °1)p0
1X1 + p1¡ C0










2 = 0 (9)
(1 ¡ °2)p
0
2X2 + p2¡ C
0
2 · 0 (10)




From the fact that °2 ¸ 0, and from (10) and (9), we get p2 +p0
2X2 · (1 ¡ °2)p0
2X2 + p2 ·
p1 +p0
1X1. We thus have a contradiction.
Lemma 1 can be explained as follows. The government's stake in ¯rm 1 adds a positive
contribution to domestic output which is above domestic market marginal revenue. If ¯rm 1
nevertheless decides to sell only on market 2, this is because the market 2 marginal revenue
is greater than marginal bene¯t in market 1. As the ¯rm 2 marginal bene¯t in market 2
is at least as great as market 2 marginal revenue, ¯rm 2 will be a situation where marginal
8bene¯t in market 2 is greater than marginal revenue in market 1 and thus, should produce
a positive amount for market 2.
Note that even if the two ¯rms were pro¯t maximizers (°1 = °2 = 0), the case where
each ¯rm would sell only on the foreign market (x11 = x22 = 0) would be rather unusual, as
it would require that C0
1 = C0
2 and p1 + p0
1X1 = p2 + p0
2X2 simultaneously. Throughout the
analysis below, we will thus assume that either x11 or x22 is positive at equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If °i < 1 for i = 1 or i = 2, then there exists international trade at equilibrium,
i.e. either x12 > 0 or x21 > 0 (or both).
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that 0 · °1 < 1 (while 0 · °2 · 1) and that




1X1 + p1¡ C
0
1 = 0 (11)
p2¡ C
0
1 · 0 (12)
p1¡ C
0
2 · 0 (13)
(1 ¡ °2)p0
2X2 + p2¡ C0
2 = 0 (14)
From (12) and (11) and the fact that °1 < 1, we have that p2 · (1 ¡ °1)p0
1X1 + p1 < p1.
From the fact that °2 · 1 and from (14) and (13), we have p2 ¸ (1 ¡ °2)p0
2X2 + p2 ¸ p1.
We thus have a contradiction.
Lemma 2 is explained in a similar manner as Lemma 1. If ¯rm 1 decides to sell only
on market 1, its marginal bene¯t on market 1 is greater or equal to its marginal revenue on
market 2, which, at x12 = 0, is the price on market 2: (1¡ °1)p0
1X1 +p1 ¸ p2: As the price
on one market is necessarily greater than the domestic ¯rm's marginal bene¯t on the same
market, we then have p1 > (1¡ °1)p0
1X1 + p1 ¸ p2 > (1 ¡ °2)p0
2X2 + p2: This implies that
¯rm 2's marginal bene¯t on market 1, which, at x12 = 0, is the price on market 1, is greater
than its marginal bene¯t on market 2. This should bring ¯rm 2 to sell on market 1.
9Note that even if the two ¯rms were welfare maximizers (°1 = °2 = 1), the case where
there would be no international trade (x12 = x21 = 0) would be unusual as it would require
that p1 = p2 and C0
1 = C0
2. Throughout the analysis below, we will assume that either x12
or x21 is positive at equilibrium.
Let "i be the price elasticity of demand on market i and sij be the market share of ¯rm
i in country j; this allows to rewrite (5) in the following way:










i 6= j (15)
where both sides become equal whenever xii > 0. The second equality was obtained by
multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of the ¯rst line RHS by (xii+xji). In
a similar manner, condition (6) can be rewritten as:






i 6= j (16)
where both sides are equal whenever xij > 0.
Condition (16) is the usual condition on the Lerner index in a Cournot equilibrium.
This re°ects pro¯t maximizing behavior on the foreign market. The impact of public
control is seen in equation (15): for given price elasticity and market share,6 it decreases
the Lerner index to the extent of the government's stake. Intuitively, the weight attached by
governement to consumer surplus increases the marginal bene¯t of domestic consumption
and thus, leads the domestic ¯rm to increase output delivered to the domestic market,
relative to the pro¯t maximizing output.

















, i = 1;2;j 6= i (17)
6Obviously, the price elasticity and the market share are endogenous. In section 4, we perform the
comparative statics following a change in public ownership.
10Since the price mark-up is computed from the same marginal cost benchmark in both mar-



























Thus, if governments of both countries have exactly the same stake in their home en-
terprise, we obtain the well-known result that the price will the lowest in the market which
has the most elastic demand. However, public ownership quali¯es this result : for given
elasticities, price will be lower in the country where government has a greater stake in the
national enterprise.
3.2 Second Order Conditions
In order to insure global uniqueness of the solution , we make the following assumption (see
Nikaido [13], chap. VII).



























is an N-P matrix, i.e. all the principal minors of odd orders are negative and those of even
orders are positive.
Elements of H are the partial derivatives with respect to x11 (1st column), x12 (2nd
column), x21 (3rd column) and x22 (4th column) of @U1=@x11 (1st row), @U1=@x12 (2nd row),
@U2=@x21 (3rd row) and @U2=@x22 (4th row), respectively. As these ¯rst order derivatives
must vanish for interior solutions, this matrix of second-order derivatives lies behind the
comparative statics analysis.


























i > 0 i 6= j; i 2 f1;2g (22)
which are the second-order conditions for ¯rm i's maximization problem.
Moreover, in order to havewell-behavedbest-response functions, we assume the following.










Assumptions 2(i) and2 (ii) are always satis¯ed if inverse demandfunctions are decreasing
and cost functions are convex. Assumption 2 (iii) means that ¯rm i's marginal revenue on
the foreign market falls as its rival's output increases.
3.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze what happens to outputs when government of country i changes
°i, i.e. the stake that it has in its own enterprise. We assume an interior equilibrium at
initial stakes.8
7Arguments of functions are omitted for ease of presentation. We will draw upon other implications of
Assumption 1 when we perform comparative statics.
8If xi1 = xi2 = 0, we would have that ¯rm j 6= i acts as a monopoly on both markets, which is the classic
textbook case on ¯rst degree price discrimination. If xii = 0, ¯rm j 6= i is a monopoly on market i. If
12Proposition 1 Let us assume that, for given °1 and °2, (x11;x12;x21;x22) > 0 at equilib-










































Proof. See Appendix A
Here is the intuition behind Proposition 1.9 An increase in government 1's stake in ¯rm
1 means that the marginal bene¯t of domestic production has increased for this ¯rm. This
leads ¯rm 1 to increase its domestic sales. As a result, its marginal cost of production is
initially higher. Since the marginal bene¯t function on market 2 has not changed, ¯rm 1
is forced to lower foreign sales. Thus ¯rm 2 marginal bene¯t of its sales on its own market
increases and this leads ¯rm 2to increase its sales on market 2. As this increases its marginal
cost while its marginal bene¯t function on market 1 remains the same, ¯rm 2 then reduces
production on market 1. Wethen enter a second round where ¯rm 1 sees its marginal bene¯t
increase as ¯rm 2 retreats from its market. The assumption made on matrix H insures that
this process converges.
The upshot is that an increase in government's stake in one market increases production
in both markets. Nevertheless, the impact of public ownership is to \isolate" markets in the
sense that the share of the foreign ¯rm in a given market is reduced: sales of the foreign ¯rm
are lowered while those of the domestic ¯rm are increased in an overall bigger market.
xij = 0 for j 6= i, then ¯rm j is a monopoly on market j. The last two cases of a monopoly in one market
and a duopoly in another has been thouroughly analyzed by Bulow et al. [6]. It turns out that results of
Proposition 1 carry over to these cases in the sense that the signs of derivatives remain the same for non-zero
variables.
9For ease of interpretation, we consider in this paragraph that cost functions are convex, although this
is not necessary. Proposition 1 holds under more general cost functions provided that Assumption 1 still
holds.
134 Choice of Governments' Stakes
4.1 First Order Conditions
We now turn to the choice of governments' stakes in their respective domestic ¯rm. Each
government wants to maximise social welfare function Wi (i = 1;2) given the stake of the
other government in its national ¯rm. Labeling xij(°i;°k), i;j;k = 1;2, k 6= i, the stage 2




s.t. 0 · °i · 1
























Let us assume that this total derivative is equal to zero for 0 < °¤
i < 1 and that
xii(°¤
i;°j) > 0: Then, from ¯rst order condition (5) with respect to the optimal choice
of output by the ¯rm, we have:
pi ¡ p0
ixji ¡ C0
i = ¡(1¡ °¤
i)p0
i(xii +xji) (24)





































The second term of the last line shows that the optimal stake is the lower the higher is
the foreign enterprise share of the domestic market (sji) and the higher is the crowding-out
14e®ect (dxji=dxii), i.e. the more the foreign ¯rm reduces sales as the domestic ¯rm increases
prouductionfor its own market. This comes from the factthat if it is pro¯table for the foreign
¯rm to enter the domestic market (so that sji > 0), it is welfare-enhancing to accommodate
entry since this brings a reduction in marginal cost. Such accomodation is done through a
decrease of public ownership, whichleads the domestic ¯rm to decrease domestic production.
The more responsive is the foreign ¯rm to a decrease of domestic output (i.e the greater is
jdxji=dxiij), the lesser is the optimal government stake in the domestic ¯rm. In other words,
the greater is the crowding-out of foreign production made by domestic output (again, the
greater is jdxji=dxiij), the lesser is the optimal government stake in the domestic ¯rm.
The third term of the RHS of (25) shows the relationship between the domestic and
foreign markets. This term weighs the importance of the foreign market in the pro¯tability
of the domestic ¯rm : the greater are the opportunities on the foreign market, the more
interesting it becomes to have the ¯rm to act as a pro¯t maximizer. As a result, the
government's stake is the lower (i) the greater is the share of the domestic ¯rm in the
foreign market consumption; (ii) the greater is the relative price of foreign sales to domestic
sales; (iii) the more elastic is the domestic demand, since market power of the ¯rm is then
lower, so that private ownership is less costly in terms of welfare; (iv) the less elastic is the
foreign demand, because of the greater price-marginal cost mark-up that it can result; and
(v) the greater is the increase of the foreign ¯rm production following an increase of public
ownership in the foreign market, since such an increase lowers the marginal revenue of the
domestic ¯rm on the foreign market.
Condition (25) is also useful to analyze under which conditions corner solutions could
arise. In order for ¯rm i to be entirely controlled by government, we should have that
x12 = x21 = 0. In turn, this would mean that government j would also choose to have
a 100% stake. We have observed from Lemma 2 that this could occur only if p1 = p2
simultaneously with C0
1 = C0
2, as there is no possible gain from trade possible and each
government then chooses to price at the (same) marginal cost. As this situation would
15rather be exceptional, the model predicts that opening of markets will generally be followed
by the privatization of (some) shares of the state-owned enterprises.
It is howeverpossible that one or both¯rms will bepro¯t maximizer at optimum, i.e. that
°1 = 0 or °2 = 0 (or both). A plausible case is one where both markets are of very di®erent
sizes : the small country could then see that the pro¯t opportunity of the foreign market is
overwhelming compared to social welfare increases that are possible on the domestic market.
4.2 Existence
Existence of an equilibrium stems simply from the fact that reaction functions in the ¯rst



















































































j 6= i; j = f1;2g (27)
All functions in the RHS, including the derivatives, are continuous. As a result, the
best-response functions are continuous. Since each player's strategy set ([0;1]) is compact
and convex, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium need not
be unique.
5 Conclusion
Thechoiceofa government'sstake ina public utility implies atrade-o® betweentheallocative
e±ciency on the domestic market and potential pro¯ts on external markets. In this paper,
16we have built a model that make this trade-o® explicit and that highlight the fact that
the ownership structure of a ¯rm in one country has an impact on the behavior and the
ownership of ¯rms in all countries.
Some of the factors that we have identi¯ed as correlated with state ownership, such as
¯rms' output shares, are observable. Some empirical tests could then be performed on
markets where exchanges are mostly bilateral (e.g. Canada and U.S.) in order to make
predictions on state ownership in certain industries (e.g. electricity). However, we can
already notice that recent privatizations which accompanied regulatory reforms are well
explained by our model. First, by going from a monopolistic structure to an oligopolistic
one, market power is reduced. Second, with market liberalization, the former incumbent
national monopoly can obtain pro¯ts on foreign markets, which were previously protected
by barriers to entry. According to our model, both changes favor privatization.
On the theorical side, an immediate extension of the model would be to have more than
two ¯rms/countries. This should tend to reduce governments' stakes as each ¯rm's market
power would be reduced and thus, domestic allocative e±ciency would be increased.
Also, the model is presently biased towards public ownership because government maxi-
mizes welfarewhile private shareholders want to restrain output to maximize pro¯t. As there
is often a presumption that productive e±ciency is impaired by public ownership,10 a more
realistic model would make the cost function to be dependent upon °i, with @Ci=@°i > 0.
This is left for future research.
10There is pervasive evidence that state-owned enterprises have higher costs than private companies.
Boardman and Vining [2], Vining and Boardman [14] and Dewenter and Malatesta [8] ¯nd that the prof-
itability performance of state-owned enterprises is worse than that of private companies on competitive
markets.
17A Proof of Proposition 1










































































i = 1;2, i 6= j. The square matrix on the LHS is matrix H de¯ned in (19). From
assumption 1, we have that detH > 0.

























































The numerator is then p0
1(x11+x21)¢ det H11 where H11 is the cofactor of element h11. The






























































2). This is positive as C00
1 > 0,
h2
21 < 0 and h2
12 < 0 by assumption 1, and h1
12 < 0, h2
11 < 0 and C00
2 > 0 in virtue
of assumptions 1 and 2(iii), respectively. As the denominator is also positive, we have
dx22=d°1 > 0.


























i = 1;2 i 6= j (31)
which is negative since C00
i > 0, hi
ij < 0 by assumption 1 and hi
jj < 0 by assumption
assumption 2(iii).
Turning to total consumption in a given market, we compare the absolute value of




























































































¯ ¯ > 0:
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